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Lawyers and social justice
by Michael E. Tigar
Crusaders in the Courts, by Jack
Greenberg. Basic Books, 10 E. 53rd
St., New York, N.Y. 10022. 212-2077057. 1994. xxii, 643 pages. $30.
n the late 1940s a law student
named Jack Greenberg read that a
half-unit of credit was available to students who would work on civil rights
cases. Although the hours were long
for such a meager reward, Greenberg,
a war veteran recently returned from
the Pacific, signed up.
This experience may not have been
transformative for this immigrant's
son who had grown up in the socialistZionist milieu of the Bronx, where
concerns for social justice were close at
hand. But it did propel Greenberg
into contact with Thurgood Marshall
and the other great leaders of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund. Shortly
after Greenberg graduated from law
school he become an LDF staff lawyer.
Crusaders in the Courts, an important
and richly detailed book, is an account
of the next 40 years in litigation to defend and extend civil rights.
It is the sort of book to give one's
children, who, as they confront the
path ahead, may not know how long
and arduous the journey has been.
The book also tells law students something about the role lawyers can play in
social change, and even about the limits of that role. Lawyers are, after all, in
charge of remembering. Sometimes
their rememberings are trivial, as with
the citation of a rule to govern procedure. Sometimes, the remembering is
malign, as in quoting a harsh precedent so that the same thing may be
done again. But in the most fulfilling
and helpful sense, lawyers are to remember injustice in order to help prevent it in the future.

separatism.
The Legal Defense Fund took the
position that integration was the best
road to follow, for the African-American community and as a strategy for
litigation. As Thurgood Marshall said
to the Supreme Court in 1950, "We
want to remove governmental restriction-if they want to, they can keep
their prejudices." It is easier to act
yourself into right thinking than to
think yourself into right acting. If race
hatred was to be exposed and eroded,
Casting our minds back, we will re- ending forced segregation was the way
call there was no federal civil rights to do it.
legislation of consequence until the
Greenberg chronicles the path to
Civil Rights Act of 1964. We may also Brown v. Board of Education and berecall the ways in which the walls of yond. The first task was to confront the
segregation were breached, first tenta- old "separate but equal" teaching of
tively and then more insistently. The Plessy v. Ferguson. One example of this
African-American political ferment of early litigation related by Greenberg is
the 1920s, 1930s, and early 1940s led to particularly telling for me, as I teach at
demands for change. Charles Hamil- a law school desegregated by the Supreme Court's opinion in Sweatt v.
ton Houston, Thurgood Marshall's
mentor, played an early and decisive Painter.Heamon Sweatt applied for adrole in shaping the Legal Defense mission to the University of Texas
Fund's strategy. Houston was a princi- School of Law, but was refused because
pal architect of Steele v. Louisville & Na- he was not white. His Texas lawyer, W.J.
tional Railway Co., in which the Su- Durham, asked Thurgood Marshall
preme Court held that a compulsory and James NabritJr. to help litigate the
bargaining agent for railway workers case.
had a "duty of fair representation."
Texas responded by setting up a
That is, the union could not foster dis- "law school for Negroes," which it
crimination in the workplace, nor in claimed was equal to the one for
terms of employment. It had the duty whites. The new school was in rented
to represent all the covered employees basement quarters and had neither liequally.
brary, nor law review, nor permanent
faculty. Its teachers were part-time volA new strategy
unteers from UT Law School, and
Steele, decided in 1944, vindicated a liti- Charles McCormick, who also served
gation strategy based on representing as dean of The University of Texas
group interests. One must pause to ask School of Law, was its dean.
what made this sort of approach posThe NAACP had said that requiring
sible? The "civil procedure" answer is literal compliance with "separate but
that the Federal Rules of Civil Proce- equal" would eventually bring an end
dure, which became effective in 1937, to segregation, which would prove to
broadened the availability of class ac- be too expensive. But nobody in May
tions. But there could not be suits with- 1947 could know just how or when this
transition would take place.
out clients and theories.
The State of Texas put on witnesses,
The clients were among the newly
militant African-Americans in the including Charles McCormick, who
workplace and the community, and swore that the two schools were equal.
those contemplating advancement Sweatt's lawyers pointed out that the
through education. The theory was law schools could not possibly provide
more controversial. In African-Ameri- equality in all the things that matter in
can groups and among the white legal education, including the collegiAmerican left, there had been the old ality of studying and working with othdebate whether an integrationist strat- ers. In 1950, the Supreme Court
egy was preferable to some form of agreed, and the tone of its opinion
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foreshadowed the holding in Brown
that separate schools are inherently
unequal.
The LDF lawyers-Marshall, Greenberg, Nabrit, and others-succeeded
grandly at the law's most difficult
game. They took an existing paradigm-"separate but equal," which
had been devised to restrain claims for
justice-and recast it as a promise that
they demanded be fulfilled. Since the
paradigm had been devised by judges
and met the standards for judicial enforcement by injunction, they brought
their claims to federal court.

but of grim reality. Its decision to
launch a litigation strategy is in the
best tradition of its earlier victories.
Only the Supreme Court's decision in
McCleskey v. Kemp, barring consideration of systemic racial bias in administration of the death penalty, has kept
the issue from being more fully explored in the Court's opinions.
The LDF lawyers were an essential
part of the struggle for change as it
shifted focus from education to public
accommodation, to housing, jobs, and
the criminal justice system. They were
counsel in some of the most significant
constitutional decisions in the nation's
history. Greenberg draws on the trove
of LDF records to tell that story.

Reliance on the courts
The LDF lawyers therefore gave courts
dominated by judges appointed by
Roosevelt and Truman the opportu- A lack of charity
nity to agree that the promise must be To have been an LDF leader during
enforced. By insisting on enforce- this difficult period required tenacity
ment, they showed that the paradigm and singleness of purpose at the time
was itself fatally flawed-that both of the battles were being waged. There
its promises could not be kept. That is, are, however, moments in Greenberg's
that separate could not be equal.
book when one wishes that the disUntil the Civil Rights Act of 1964, al- tance of years and the savor of victory
most the entire burden of extending had led him to be more charitable to
human rights through the legal pro- his allies and opponents.
For example, I was taken aback by
cess in the postwar period fell upon
the federal courts, with occasional Greenberg's characterization of Dean
help from the executive branch. McCormick's Sweatt v. PaintertestiGreenberg's book helps us remember mony: "If the thought of testifying
and celebrate the role of Article III honestly had crossed his mind he
judges, fulfilling their oaths and their would have had to consider that the
constitutional duty to defend counter- state legislature would retaliate with
majoritarian principles rooted in the devastating disapproval." This comes
Constitution. There is an unfortunate close to accusing McCormick of pertendency these days to minimize, and juring himself, saved only by the appareven to deride, the resort to courts as ent qualification that perhaps McCorprotectors of rights. As an example, on mick didn't have a thought about
January 25, 1993, the day after Thur- testifying differently. I asked our librargood Marshall died, Justice Clarence ians to unearth the Sweatt transcriptThomas filed a concurring opinion in the actual typewriter carbon copy on
Graham v. Collins. The opinion con- onionskin-and spent a joyous couple
tained an all-out attack on the LDF's of hours reading over the words of facapital punishment litigation strategy, miliar figures.
calling it the work of "a small number
Fair-minded people can differ, but I
of ambitious lawyers and academics on don't find McCormick's testimony disthe Fund's behalf."
honest or false. Make no mistake,
Greenberg's book is a decisive an- McCormick should have spoken up for
swer to Justice Thomas's contentions, integration of the law school. His fears
if one sees LDF history not as lawyers' about the political and social consevictories but as responses to the de- quences of accepting integration were
mands of African-Americans for hu- misplaced, and he had a duty to assert
man rights. LDF's arraignment of the leadership. But reading McCormick's
criminal justice system and its inherent testimony as a trial lawyer, I can see
racial bias is emphatically not the how carefully he wove his version of
product of professorial imagination events and focused on the literal
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truth-such things as square feet of
space per student and the debatable
value of law reviews.
More troubling is Greenberg's unwillingness to rethink old disputes with
his allies in the civil rights movement,
and his repetition of some unflattering
and surely undeserved castigation of
those with whom he disagreed. For example, the 1963-64 period in Danville,
Virginia, saw a tactical dispute between
more conservative and more militant
African-American leaders. At the center of this controversy was a lawyer
named Len Holt who did a lot of good
work and had the confidence of many
people in the movement for change.
Greenberg dismisses the controversy
with Holt by saying, "[W] e thought he
wasn't a very good lawyer or reliable."
This is too curt, too dismissive, and
does less than full justice to the historical record.
There is a disturbingly similar lack
of charity toward the National Lawyers' Guild and its members, and the
young LDF lawyers in Greenberg's
own office who urged him to be more
receptive to the defense of embattled
radical leaders such as Angela Davis.
Greenberg does not even mention the
significant contributions of many influential lawyers and groups, such as
Arthur Kinoy and the Center for Constitutional Rights, nor some leading
cases won by non-LDF attorneys, such
as Dombrowski v. Pfister.
This is not to say that Greenberg
should alter his views of these events,
only that one of the lessons we need to
learn about change is how to behave
toward our allies-and even our opponents of good will.
I have a broader concern about taking history so personally, illustrated by
Greenberg's statement about May
1963: "I won a group of sit-in cases in
the Supreme Court." Who won? Lawyers are privileged to stand at the center of social change only because some
clients risked something for their principles and then came to them for help.
It is easy to slip into saying that "I the
lawyer" won, just like an obstetrician
may say "I delivered the baby." But
such figures of speech mask someone
else's real struggle to bring something
about.
The sit-in cases came to be because

young black men and women took
risks to speed the pace of change.
Greenberg was among the courageous
lawyers who came to their defense despite the misgivings of more conservative leaders. The eventual Supreme
Court victory was a vindication for the
lawyers who helped, but mainly for the
young people whose action and tactics
propelled nonviolent resistance to the

centerpiece of the civil rights movement. This decisive shift meant that
the movement would no longer be
content only with such victories as the
courts might eventually give, but
would engage in a broader political offensive for its goals.
Many of us can close our eyes and remember a segregated social landscape.
We open our eyes and see today's hu-

Unintended consequences
by Albert P. Melone
Critical Judicial Nominations and
Political Change: The Impact of
Clarence Thomas, by Christopher E.
Smith. Praeger Publishers, 88 Post
Road West, Westport, Ct. 06881.
800-225-5800. 1993. 192 pages.
$47.95.
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ominations to the U.S. Supreme
Court in recent years have attracted the interest of the media and a
large segment of the public. Personal
ambitions and the clash of political
forces combine to create compelling
drama. Christopher Smith's book,
CriticalJudicialNominationsand Political
Change: The Impact of Clarence Thomas,
contributes to our understanding of
these events by focusing on the unintended consequences of nominations
to the Supreme Court.
Readers intrigued by the Clarence
Thomas nomination will find the
author's treatment a useful reminder
of events. Professor Smith shows that
the charges of sexual harassment, and
the events surrounding them, transformed the confirmation controversy
from the nominee's professional qualifications and the future direction of
the Supreme Court into a catalytic political event. The Senate hearings
served to mobilize women as candidates and as voters, having a profound
impact on the 1992 congressional elections and to a lesser extent the presidential election.
The author's chief purpose is to propose a new conceptualization of judicial nominations. It is this part of the

Associate Justice Clarence Thomas

book that needs work; indeed, Smith
admits as much. Yet this aspect of the
book reveals a mind at work, a struggle
to make sense of events. As important
as this intellectual process is to creation of new understandings, the
reader is left with the impression that
the author has the beginning of an
idea, not a concept that possesses, as of
yet, intellectual maturity.
Four characteristics
The author defines critical judicial
nominations as those serving "...as
catalytic events for important changes
in politics and public policy that were
not anticipated by the political actors
who initiated the nominations"
(p. 11). The concept has four characteristics. First, a critical nomination
may involve unsuccessful as well as sucMarch-April 1995

man rights tasks. When we think of
how far we have come, the tales well
told in this book inform us and help us
teach those who have forgotten or who
never knew. When we assess what we
must do, this book helps us chart our
course. V1
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cessful nominations. Second, critical
nominations must trigger important
political events, not minor ones. Third,
critical nominations result in consequences that go beyond changes in legal doctrine. Fourth, the nominations
must result in consequences unanticipated by the political actors responsible for making the appointment.
The last three of Smith's four necessary conditions for a critical nomination suffer from excessive vagueness. He does not inform us how to
identify an "important political event"
except in slightly less vague ways. But
Smith does offer a few examples from
history to illustrate his idea. Most notable are the nominations of John
Marshall and Abe Fortas. However,
both instances also illustrate the difficulty with the concept.
The author claims that President
John Adams could not have anticipated the impactJohn Marshall would
ultimately have on the role of the Supreme Court in American society. Yet
Adams appointed his trusted secretary
of state because of his Federalist views.
Adams had every reason to believe that
Marshall would support Federalist
policies. Marshall did not disappoint
Adams, nor anyone else who might
have believed in a strong central government. Consistent with conventional wisdom, the author mistakenly
asserts that Marshall's employment of
judicial review is his true claim to fame
because by so doing the chief justice
made the Supreme Court a main
player in the nation's political life.
Smith is correct that this is something
Adams could not have anticipated.
However, today's use of the judicial
review doctrine is not what Marshall
decided in Marbury v. Madison. Strictly
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